Opponents of the Bill say it is unnecessary because the existing law is clear and they need “more than anecdotes to justify changing the law”[1].
The 19,521 “anecdotal” responses to the Department for Health public consultation supporting the Bill are apparently not enough evidence for some that the Bill is necessary to make the law clearer.
But evidence is to be found in the decisions of the courts, if one looks for it. Take the very recent case of McGovern v Sharkey[2]. The Appendix to this Note contains extracts from the judgment in this case; the judge’s articulation of the special legal principles to be applied in cases of clinical negligence demonstrate that whatever the law on this area may be, it is neither clear, nor simple nor certain.
The case also illustrates how the present law assumes that every claim will involve the claimant and the defendant each hiring two or more doctors to oppose each other in the witness box. One reason why the law is so uncertain is that it depends on how impressive the two sets of witnesses are at trial.
Which is why at present claimants may be advised to sue whether they have a good case or not, because there is always a chance that they will have a “surprise win”; and key opponents of the Bill – notably Leigh Day & Co. – profit from running “no win no fee” cases relying on the uncertainty of the existing law[3].
The Bill will preserve the existing common law for cases where it is necessary and sufficient. But it will also add a new statutory procedure by which doctors and patients can achieve clarity and certainty at the point of treatment. By following the process set out in the Bill, doctors can be confident that a decision to depart from standard practice will be upheld as responsible by the courts, the regulatory bodies and others.
That will improve certainty for doctors and patients, who can concentrate on exploring sensible avenues towards innovative treatments for rare conditions, and bringing hope to patients where it is reasonable and responsible to do so.
APPENDIX
EXTRACT FROM JUDGMENT IN MCGovern v Sharkey
[42] Disputes about questions of fact depend on the usual burden and standard of proof. However in relation to clinical or professional judgment the position is different. Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 established that, in determining whether a defendant has fallen below the required standard of care, regard must be shown to responsible medical opinion, and to the fact that reasonable doctors may differ. A practitioner who acts in conformity with an accepted current practice is not negligent “merely because there is a body of opinion which would take a contrary view.” In Hunter v Hanley 1955 SLT 231 at 217 it was stated that
“In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for genuine difference of opinion and one man clearly is not negligent merely because his conclusion differs from that of other professional men … The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if acting with ordinary care … ”
That test in Hunter v Hanley, was approved in Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1985] 1 All ER 635 and Lord Scarman also stated “It is not enough to show that there is a body of competent professional opinion which considers that theirs was a wrong decision, if there also exists a body of professional opinion, equally competent, which supports the decision as reasonable in the circumstances. … Differences of opinion and practice exist, and will always exist, in the medical as in other professions. There is seldom any one answer exclusive of all others to problems of professional judgment. A court may prefer one body of opinion to the other, but that is no basis for a conclusion of negligence.
… I have to say that a judge’s ‘preference’ for one body of distinguished professional opinion to another also professionally distinguished is not sufficient to establish negligence in a practitioner whose actions have received the seal of approval of those whose opinions, truthfully expressed, honestly held, were not preferred. If this was the real reason for the judge’s finding, he erred in law even though elsewhere in his judgment he stated the law correctly. For in the realm of diagnosis and treatment negligence is not established by preferring one respectable body of professional opinion to another. Failure to exercise the ordinary skill of a doctor (in the appropriate speciality, if he be a specialist) is necessary” (emphasis added).
[43] In Bolitho (Administratrix of the Estate of Patrick Nigel Bolitho (deceased)) v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771 it was established that a doctor could be liable for negligence in respect of diagnosis and treatment despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning his conduct where it had not been demonstrated to the judge’s satisfaction that the body of opinion relied on was reasonable or responsible. In the vast majority of cases the fact that distinguished experts in the field were of a particular opinion would demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion. However, in a rare case, if it could be demonstrated that the professional opinion was not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge would be entitled to hold that the body of opinion was not reasonable or responsible. Accordingly the final arbiter as to whether there has been professional negligence is the court and not the medical profession. It is for the court to decide whether the requisite logical basis for a defendant’s expert medical opinion is absent. The legal question is as to what features particularly characterise an expert medical opinion as one that is “illogical”, “irresponsible”, and “indefensible”. It is clear that merely being a minority view of accepted medical practice does not, of itself, render that view “illogical” or “irrational” in the Bolitho sense. However it is suggested that a court would be more ready to find that the body of opinion was not capable of withstanding logical analysis if there was a dubious expert whose professional views existed at the fringe of medical consciousness, see Khoo v. Gunapathy d/o Muniandy [2002] 2 S.L.R. 414, at [63]. Another example would be “a residual adherence to out-of-date ideas” which “on examination do not really stand up to analysis” see Hucks v. Cole [1993] 4 Med. L.R. 393.
[44] It is however important to consider some limitations to the Bolitho test. A practice is illogical if there was a “clear precaution” which ought to have been, but was not taken. In this case the precaution that is suggested is that there ought to have been a diagnostic vitrectomy after one month given the risks of an unidentified tear of the retina and what is suggested was the lack of response to steroid treatment. However if there are risks attached to the precaution, in this case the risks associated with operating on an inflamed eye and the risk that the operation will not resolve the underlying problem, and one body of medical opinion considers that the risks ought to have been taken and the other does not then there is no “clear precaution” but rather a balancing of risks. In such circumstances both sets of expert opinion withstand logical analysis. For the plaintiff the expert opinion being that the risk of an adverse outcome, in that a tear was present in the retina, should have been prevented by taking the precaution of performing the vitrectomy. For the other body of expert opinion on behalf of the defendant, the precaution of performing a vitrectomy would have posed an unacceptable risk of operating upon an inflamed eye where given the diagnosis of ERD the operation would not have achieved a satisfactory outcome. This is merely a different weighing of risk rather than a determination that the defendant’s expert opinion is illogical. The precaution that is being suggested is not a “clear precaution” but rather a precaution which involves a balancing of risks and that is a matter of clinical judgment with a logical basis.
[45] Another feature of applying the Bolitho test is that it introduces a lack of symmetry as between the plaintiff and the defendant’s expert evidence. The defendant’s expert has only to persuade the court that his views are capable of withstanding logical analysis, but he does not have to satisfy the court that the views of the plaintiff’s expert are not capable of withstanding logical analysis. However, the plaintiff’s expert has to do both.
[46] If the case is one that involves clinical judgment to which the Bolam test applies, and if the medical practitioner does produce evidence that his practice was supported by a responsible body of medical opinion, then, in the words of Sedley L.J. in Adams v. Rhymney Valley DC [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 777, at [41], “the judge or jury have to accept the opinion of a body of responsible practitioners, unless it is unreasonable [in the Bolitho sense]” (emphasis added).
Accordingly in an action involving clinical judgment there is a two-step procedure to determine the question of alleged medical negligence:
(a) whether the medical practitioner acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper for an ordinarily competent medical practitioner by a responsible body of medical opinion; and
(b) if “yes”, whether the practice survives Bolitho judicial scrutiny as being “responsible” or “logical”.
[47] Questions of fact and the question as to whether there was negligence are not to be conflated. Questions such as whether in the event there was a right retinal tear or hole in December 2006 or whether there was inflammation in the right eye in 2007 or whether there was scleral thickening in the right eye are questions of fact to be determined on the balance of probabilities with the onus of proof being on the plaintiff. The question of clinical and professional judgment as to whether a responsible body of medical opinion would form the view, in say January 2007, that there was a right retinal tear or hole or that there was inflammation in the right eye or that there was scleral thickening in the right eye are all subject to the Bolam test as qualified in Bolitho. In some cases the determination of a question of fact may lead inexorably to a finding that the medical practitioner did not act in conformity with an accepted current practice. In others it may have no such impact. So for instance in this case if there was a factual finding, on the balance of probabilities, that on 26 December 2006 the first defendant was informed that the plaintiff had suffered a sudden and profound loss of vision in his right eye and that the plaintiff’s right eye was not assessed or if the plaintiff was not advised to have his right eye assessed that day then inexorably that would lead to a finding that the first defendant had not acted in conformity with an accepted practice. Inexorably because no logical accepted current practice would do or advise anything other than immediate action. However if the factual finding was that the first defendant was informed that the plaintiff had some extremely modest effect on his vision in conjunction with a history that drops had not been taken then (though there was a dispute about this) it might be that to delay an examination until 4 January 2007 and to recommend that the plaintiff use his drops was in conformity with a logical accepted current practice.
[1] “The law currently works and is fair and clear. I am afraid that I require more than a few anecdotes to justify changing the law.” – Suzanne White, Partner, Leigh Day & Co; http://www.clinicalnegligencelaw.co.uk/2014/07/20/innovate-innovate-saatchi-bill/ – accessed 4.1.15.
[2] [2014] NIQB 117 – http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2014/117.html
[3] “Do you take cases on a “no win, no fee” basis? Does that mean I won’t have to pay anything at all? Yes we do.” – http://www.leighday.co.uk/Illness-and-injury/Clinical-negligence/FAQs/Costs – Accessed 4.1.15.